UNRAVELLING GUJARAT TERRORISM MYSTERY

By Malladi Rama Rao

August 17 arrest of Mufti Abu Bashir, and eight others in connection with the string of 17 explosions that rocked Ahmedabad on July 26, and the August 19 detention of 13 persons allegedly involved with the May 13 blasts in Jaipur leave as many questions as they answer.

Gujarat police claim that the so called Indian Mujahideen is the good old SIMI - Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI).

‘Remove the first letter and the last letter. You get IM which is really a pseudonym’, the state police chief says. But some experts believe that Indian Mujahideen is a breakaway militant faction of SIMI. Another view is that it is a cooperative effort between Kashmiri militant groups, SIMI and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) or Harkat-ul Jihad al-Islami (HUJI). Any of these three theories could be true.

“Kashmiri groups have traditionally used a number of names in an attempt to sow confusion—confusion further aided by the fact that the Kashmiri militants tend to be a fractious bunch. Furthermore, in general, people arrested by the police for violent undertakings who are part of a particular organization will commonly deny membership in an effort to protect their fellow members from government action. This murky milieu makes it very difficult to sort out the true identity of the group calling itself the Indian Mujahideen”, Fred Burton and Scott Stewart write in their just released report titled “India: arrests, revelations and implications’.

The report by the Texas based Strategic Forecasting, Stratfor, goes on to say: “What we do know, however, is that some people who were at some point affiliated with SIMI do appear to be connected with these attacks and that the attacks were claimed by the Indian Mujahideen. We also know that some SIMI members have been closely linked to other Kashmiri militant groups such as LeT and HUJI”.

What the report left unsaid is the fact that the breakthrough came at a time the government is at sixes and sevens on the question of banning SIMI. The tribunal constituted under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act did not see any merit in the February 7 ban on the basis of a ‘dossier’ government had presented. Fretting and fuming the home ministry rushed to the apex court and obtained a stay (Aug 6) on the tribunal order even as the Congress allies – SP and RJD openly declared, ‘We see no reason for the ban (on SIMI)’.

In a refreshing move (departure?), the Union Government made ample use of the ‘Gujarat evidence’ in its fresh affidavit. ‘If SIMI is not curbed, public order will suffer’, the government told the court presenting a list of over 350 terrorist –related cases registered in Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Kerala, Tamilnadu, Karnataka, Delhi, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and West Bengal since 2001 and the arrest of over 1400 SIMI cadres.

IM had claimed responsibility for both the Ahmedabad and Jaipur attacks, as well as attacks involving eight IEDs that occurred on July 25 in Bangalore. In a series of e-mails sent to the news papers and TV channels, the militant group said its blasts were intended to demolish the faith of the “infidels” and to take revenge for the 2002 pogrom in Narendra Modi’s Gujarat. In addition to these claims, a number of operational similarities tie the Jaipur, Ahmedabad and Bangalore incidents together. Also with the failed July 29 attempt to trigger more than 20 IEDs in Surat. Sleuths opine that different bomb makers were at work in Ahmedabad and Surat. A few of the devices recovered in Surat had small gas canisters affixed to them, an element not seen in the other attacks. The timers employed in the Surat devices were stand-alone integrated circuit timers, whereas the Ahmedabad devices used simple mechanical timers.

Stratfor doesn’t buy the theory that the Surat devices were dummies intentionally constructed not to explode. Why should the militants plant so many devices if they did not want to have a big bang advertisement of their potential? “From the number and design of the Surat devices, it is clear their designers clearly wanted them to function and ultimately cause casualties”, opine Stratfor experts.

SIMILARITIES WITH B’DESH

Surat case has a resemblance to what had happened on Aug 17, 2005 in Bangladesh. Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh, Harkat ul Jihad al Islami (Huji) and other Islamist groups staged 459 simultaneous blasts in 63 of the 64 districts across the country in a matter of thirty minutes. Just as in Ahmedabad and Surat, all these were low intensity explosions. Bangladesh authorities are still grappling with the HUJI mystery and its grenade attack that damaged the left ear of Awami League leader Sheikh Hasina a year earlier on August 21, 2004.

The Gujarat-Bangladesh similarity has two clear messages.

One ISI has perfected a low cost-high intensity terror weapon namely multiple, small devices hidden in bags or boxes, placed in congested areas and activated by timers. It tested the technique in Gorakhpur, Varanasi, Faizabad and Lucknow, Bangalore and Hyderabad last year and now in Ahmedabad to devastating effect.

Second, ISI and its foot soldiers are comfortable in criss-crossing the porous India-Bangladesh border. Put differently, Pakistan agency managed by that country’s army has done a very thorough job of hiding its hand to the glee of foreign office in Islamabad, which continues to taunt Delhi for evidence of ISI involvement in India.

Bashir’s arrest is undoubtedly a big blow to SIMI. This Madrassa teacher from Hyderabad took over the mantle of the outfit five months back after SIMI general secretary Safdar Nagori landed in the police net. Riazuddin Nasir, alias Mohammed Ghouse, who was arrested in Hubli in November 2007, had spilled the beans on Nagori and led the police to the SIMI training camp at Choral (MP).

Another development is a cause for concern to the security establishment of the country. It is the IT connection.

How did the IM mange to send the e-mail soon after the Jaipur and blasts. The official view thus far is that Bashir associate, Taufique Bilal ( also known as Abdul Subhan Qureshi), had sent the mail after hacking into the Hi-Fi based Internet connection of Kenneth Haywood, an American working with a Navi Mumbai-based IT firm, Campbell White. An electronic engineer, Bilal worked for Wipro in Bangalore and two other IT companies in Hyderabad and Mumbai. Surprisingly, police did not clamp any restrictions on Haywood’s movements. Only a ‘look out’ notice has been issued saying ‘he is required to be in the country’ to aid on-going investigation. Yet, on Aug 10, he slipped out of India.

As the ‘desi’ sleuths and Stratfor experts point out, what has been unravelled is only a tip of the iceberg. The operational ability of SIMI is not affected by the few arrests in Gujarat, Karnataka and Rajasthan. There are many more trained SIMI militants on the loose. For them, large al Qaeda–type attacks will be a short leap unless India puts its best foot forward, and addresses the menace of terrorism in a bi-partisan manner.

UNRAVELLING GUJARAT TERRORISM MYSTERY

By Malladi Rama Rao

August 17 arrest of Mufti Abu Bashir, and eight others in connection with the string of 17 explosions that rocked Ahmedabad on July 26, and the August 19 detention of 13 persons allegedly involved with the May 13 blasts in Jaipur leave as many questions as they answer.

Gujarat police claim that the so called Indian Mujahideen is the good old SIMI - Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI).

‘Remove the first letter and the last letter. You get IM which is really a pseudonym’, the state police chief says. But some experts believe that Indian Mujahideen is a breakaway militant faction of SIMI. Another view is that it is a cooperative effort between Kashmiri militant groups, SIMI and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) or Harkat-ul Jihad al-Islami (HUJI). Any of these three theories could be true.

“Kashmiri groups have traditionally used a number of names in an attempt to sow confusion—confusion further aided by the fact that the Kashmiri militants tend to be a fractious bunch. Furthermore, in general, people arrested by the police for violent undertakings who are part of a particular organization will commonly deny membership in an effort to protect their fellow members from government action. This murky milieu makes it very difficult to sort out the true identity of the group calling itself the Indian Mujahideen”, Fred Burton and Scott Stewart write in their just released report titled “India: arrests, revelations and implications’.

The report by the Texas based Strategic Forecasting, Stratfor, goes on to say: “What we do know, however, is that some people who were at some point affiliated with SIMI do appear to be connected with these attacks and that the attacks were claimed by the Indian Mujahideen. We also know that some SIMI members have been closely linked to other Kashmiri militant groups such as LeT and HUJI”.

What the report left unsaid is the fact that the breakthrough came at a time the government is at sixes and sevens on the question of banning SIMI. The tribunal constituted under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act did not see any merit in the February 7 ban on the basis of a ‘dossier’ government had presented. Fretting and fuming the home ministry rushed to the apex court and obtained a stay (Aug 6) on the tribunal order even as the Congress allies – SP and RJD openly declared, ‘We see no reason for the ban (on SIMI)’.

In a refreshing move (departure?), the Union Government made ample use of the ‘Gujarat evidence’ in its fresh affidavit. ‘If SIMI is not curbed, public order will suffer’, the government told the court presenting a list of over 350 terrorist –related cases registered in Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Kerala, Tamilnadu, Karnataka, Delhi, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and West Bengal since 2001 and the arrest of over 1400 SIMI cadres.

IM had claimed responsibility for both the Ahmedabad and Jaipur attacks, as well as attacks involving eight IEDs that occurred on July 25 in Bangalore. In a series of e-mails sent to the news papers and TV channels, the militant group said its blasts were intended to demolish the faith of the “infidels” and to take revenge for the 2002 pogrom in Narendra Modi’s Gujarat. In addition to these claims, a number of operational similarities tie the Jaipur, Ahmedabad and Bangalore incidents together. Also with the failed July 29 attempt to trigger more than 20 IEDs in Surat. Sleuths opine that different bomb makers were at work in Ahmedabad and Surat. A few of the devices recovered in Surat had small gas canisters affixed to them, an element not seen in the other attacks. The timers employed in the Surat devices were stand-alone integrated circuit timers, whereas the Ahmedabad devices used simple mechanical timers.

Stratfor doesn’t buy the theory that the Surat devices were dummies intentionally constructed not to explode. Why should the militants plant so many devices if they did not want to have a big bang advertisement of their potential? “From the number and design of the Surat devices, it is clear their designers clearly wanted them to function and ultimately cause casualties”, opine Stratfor experts.

SIMILARITIES WITH B’DESH

Surat case has a resemblance to what had happened on Aug 17, 2005 in Bangladesh. Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh, Harkat ul Jihad al Islami (Huji) and other Islamist groups staged 459 simultaneous blasts in 63 of the 64 districts across the country in a matter of thirty minutes. Just as in Ahmedabad and Surat, all these were low intensity explosions. Bangladesh authorities are still grappling with the HUJI mystery and its grenade attack that damaged the left ear of Awami League leader Sheikh Hasina a year earlier on August 21, 2004.

The Gujarat-Bangladesh similarity has two clear messages.

One ISI has perfected a low cost-high intensity terror weapon namely multiple, small devices hidden in bags or boxes, placed in congested areas and activated by timers. It tested the technique in Gorakhpur, Varanasi, Faizabad and Lucknow, Bangalore and Hyderabad last year and now in Ahmedabad to devastating effect.

Second, ISI and its foot soldiers are comfortable in criss-crossing the porous India-Bangladesh border. Put differently, Pakistan agency managed by that country’s army has done a very thorough job of hiding its hand to the glee of foreign office in Islamabad, which continues to taunt Delhi for evidence of ISI involvement in India.

Bashir’s arrest is undoubtedly a big blow to SIMI. This Madrassa teacher from Hyderabad took over the mantle of the outfit five months back after SIMI general secretary Safdar Nagori landed in the police net. Riazuddin Nasir, alias Mohammed Ghouse, who was arrested in Hubli in November 2007, had spilled the beans on Nagori and led the police to the SIMI training camp at Choral (MP).

Another development is a cause for concern to the security establishment of the country. It is the IT connection.

How did the IM mange to send the e-mail soon after the Jaipur and blasts. The official view thus far is that Bashir associate, Taufique Bilal ( also known as Abdul Subhan Qureshi), had sent the mail after hacking into the Hi-Fi based Internet connection of Kenneth Haywood, an American working with a Navi Mumbai-based IT firm, Campbell White. An electronic engineer, Bilal worked for Wipro in Bangalore and two other IT companies in Hyderabad and Mumbai. Surprisingly, police did not clamp any restrictions on Haywood’s movements. Only a ‘look out’ notice has been issued saying ‘he is required to be in the country’ to aid on-going investigation. Yet, on Aug 10, he slipped out of India.

As the ‘desi’ sleuths and Stratfor experts point out, what has been unravelled is only a tip of the iceberg. The operational ability of SIMI is not affected by the few arrests in Gujarat, Karnataka and Rajasthan. There are many more trained SIMI militants on the loose. For them, large al Qaeda–type attacks will be a short leap unless India puts its best foot forward, and addresses the menace of terrorism in a bi-partisan manner.

Without Musharraf Too, Pakistan Looks The Same

By Malladi Rama Rao

New Delhi: America, Saudi Arabia and Army besides Allah – the four ‘A’s that govern Pakistan- have decided the recent course of events that culminated in the exit of President Pervez Musharraf. All the four have their own concerns over the future of the country as even after 61 years of its independent existence, Pakistan remains unstable –politically and economically. Certainly the United States has more reasons to worry. It had invested so heavily in the person of Pervez Musharraf. And he has left such a strong anti-US legacy in Pakistan that it is difficult to see the next President or the present coalition government being able to dilute anti-Americanism. In all likelihood Washington will invest all over again on its next Pakistani client. The net effect will be even lesser Pakistani effort in the ‘war on terror’.

Consider these facts. While America was a crucial external factor for his nine-years in power, the main support that mattered more for Musharraf came from his army. It is now headed by a carefully chosen general who is a former head of the notorious Inter-Services Intelligence, itself headed by a Musharraf relative. The army advised Musharraf to step down after realising that militants’ anger against the president made the army ‘desirable target’; but it also told the politicians that there should be no persecution of their former chief. There is absolutely no reason, therefore, to believe that the end of Musharraf’s era will eliminate the practice of the army having the last word on important policy matters, particularly relations with India.

Any how the experience of past few months shows that the room for optimism for a change in Pak foreign policy is indeed very limited. the Daily Times said editorially (Aug 21), the advent of PPP led coalition government has not seen any change in the direction of foreign policy: the US, India, China, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan remain the central focus as does the war on terror that at one level binds all these countries to Pakistan. Musharraf faced flak for his policies. Firstly he lacked legitimacy for his rule. Secondly he had lost liberal constituency which rallied in his support in the early days of his rule and made him overlook the need to take public on board.

Taliban presence in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) bordering Afghanistan has huge foreign policy ramifications since the US, NATO and the Karzai government in Afghanistan want to see these Islamists eliminated if not tamed into submission. President George Bush Junior, though frustrated, may not dare to ‘do a Iraq’ particularly in North and South Waziristan, now that he has entered his slog overs in the White House. That should be no consolation for Islamabad.
Politicians in Pakistan are in no hurry—actually, unable—to keep the army confined to the barracks. Their pre-occupation at this point must be to show to the people that they can govern the country with some semblance of competence. They have to urgently address many difficult issues such as the bad health of Pakistan’s economy that has seen inflation crossing 25 percent, spiralling prices of food and fuel, the plummeting (Pakistani) rupee, drying foreign investments and so on. Blaming Musharraf for these problems will not wash anymore.

Defenders of Musharraf often overlook the fact that he did little—or could not really care less—to correct the negative image of Pakistan. The reason was his double-faced policy on terrorism: bad mouthing it to impress his American and other Western patrons but not letting it disappear from his soil. Yes, he was not alone to think that patronising militants will help the country achieve its important strategic objectives. It is no secret that Islamabad wants to keep Kabul under its exclusive tutelage and also go on inflicting ‘a thousands wounds’ on India with a view to destabilising and weakening it.

Musharraf was encouraged by the ease with which the Americans surrendered before his guile, knowing full well that his intentions were not honest but doing nothing more than mildly rebuking him publicly for the sake of record. On the ground nothing was done that could rattle Musharraf—like scaling down the apparently unlimited American munificence (officially $10 billion so far) and refusing to gift him arms and equipment, allegedly meant to fight insurgency but actually used by Pakistan to add teeth to its army concentrated permanently on the eastern border with India.

The US has given no reason to assume that its policy of blindly arming Pakistan, post-Musharraf, is about to be recast, despite all the misgivings and apprehensions. The Taliban and similar groups operating from their HQ in Balochistan, as also the jihadis who head for India, will continue to flourish in Pakistan, whether it is Musharraf or someone else in power.

The civilian politicians are opposed to any military action against their ‘brethrens’ inhabiting the western border regions even as they know that ‘peace deals’ with them only saw their influence creeping disconcertingly into the ‘settled areas’ of Pakistan. Pakistan has a Janus-faced policy towards terrorism that nobody in the establishment would like to see given up.

This makes it clear that as far as patronising terrorism in the country is concerned there is going to be no change in Pakistan’s policy after the exit of Musharraf. Afghanistan will see more attacks. And so will India. For the world Pakistan would not have changed. One of the things that happened during Musharraf’s regime was that the ISI had entrenched itself very well in Bangladesh and increased its network in Nepal for operations against India. This uncomfortable scenario for India will not alter under a full ‘civilian’ rule in Pakistan notwithstanding PPP-PML (N) pledge to ‘normalise’ relations with India and Afghanistan and Zardari’s offer to open up trade with India.

The fire ignited in Kashmir, jointly or separately by the pro-Pakistan secessionists in the valley and angry Hindu right wing in the Jammu region, will not be doused completely in the near future. The politicians in Pakistan have already announced that they would raise the Kashmir issue at all world forums to embarrass and pin down India. The foreign minister of Pakistan already sounds hawkish on India. The Pakistani military is facilitating infiltration across the line of control by firing at Indian troops. The ISI, part of the army, can be sure of receiving a free hand for its extensive but covert anti-India operations, Musharraf or no Musharraf.

The more Pakistan changes the more it looks the same—from New Delhi, at least.

WILL INDIA GO FOR ELECTIONS IN NOVEMBER

By MALLADI RAMA RAO

New Delhi: A few days back, the Chief Election Commissioner of India, N.Gopalaswamy, indicated the poll body’s readiness for early Lok Sabha election. In the normal course, the term of the present Lok Sabha expires in May 2009. Elections must be held in time to constitute the new Lok Sabha. So, the next Lok Sabha poll can be expected in May next unless the ruling Congress led United Progressive Alliance government decides to seek a fresh mandate much earlier.

The Congress may not like to take the risk whatever be its troubles with its new ‘saviour’ the Samajwadi party. It will like to wait till prices come down through better supply side management. This will be possible only after the Rabi crop comes in. towards the year end. Such sequencing pushes the Grand Old Party (GOP) tryst with a fresh vote to early February at the earliest.Election commission officials have been silent about the prospects of early LS polls. Barring a stray remark of the CEC, there has been no hint of Nirvachan Sadan’s state of preparedness. But the talk of likelihood of Lok Sabha elections in November refuses to fade away. For valid reasons.

Six states – J&K, Delhi, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh, and Mizoram are due to elect their new assemblies in November. The poll body is working to complete by this month (August) end the task of revising the voters’ list in accordance with exercise carried out by the Delimitation Commission headed by ‘green judge’ Justice Kuldip Singh. Nirvachan Sadan is also busy preparing the maps of the re-drawn Lok Sabha constituencies. Once these twin tasks are completed, just one month’s notice is enough to conduct Lok Sabha election. So, if the notification is issued in September-October, the Lok Sabha polls can be held in November.

It may be recalled that the chief election commissioner had conducted and completed the Himachal Pradesh assembly polls three months before their schedule. The state cabinet did not recommend dissolution of the Himachal assembly under Article 174. In fact, it was opposed to the EC plan. The then chief minister, Veerbhadra Singh had pointed out that the state assembly had a fixed term of five years under Article 172 of the Constitution and cutting short its life was against the constitution.

CEC Gopalaswamy had brushed aside his arguments. Firstly he asserted that his decision was valid under the constitution and that logistics had prompted him to pre-pone the HP polls. The legal eagles in the Congress demurred. And went along with the EC plan. Why they did not test the EC powers remains a mute question.

Karnataka is the second state where the Election Commission can be said to have had its way with the ballot. Initially, it spoke of conducting elections eight months after the delimited constituency profiles were ready. That much time, it said, was needed to ready the voters’ lists for the new constituencies. Yet, the Karnataka elections were held three months after the delimitation exercise was over. The Janata Dal (S), Samajwadi Party, Congress and the Bahujan Samaj Party had opposed early polls in Karnataka.

If the Centre had wanted to stall the election, it could have extended the president’s rule in the state, which was imposed after the fall off the second BJP-JD(S) coalition government. It did not. The only possible inference is that the Congress was also game for early elections though experts contend that the EC by ordering early elections had violated the spirit of the constitution in Karnataka. Just as was the case in Himachal.

A school of thought in Delhi’s political circuit is that CEC Gopalaswamy will be tempted to test his logic at the altar of Lok Sabha as well. These analysts believe that he will advance the Lok Sabha elections to November to coincide with the elections for six assemblies. There is the Himachal precedent to follow. The six-assembly affair is a mini-general election and as such the nation cannot afford to have two massive electoral exercises within a span of six months. Constitutional pundits are divided. Some experts like G.V.G. Krishnamurthy, who is a former Election Commissioner, argue that constitutionally the term of the Lok Sabha cannot be tampered with.

Article 83(2) of the constitution gives a five-year term for the Lok Sabha. This period is computed from the first session of the House. Lok Sabha can be dissolved by the President only on the recommendation of the cabinet. So if the EC orders elections in November that will be against known practices.

Till TN Seshan happened, the general belief was that the Prime Minister of the day decides the poll timing. Under Seshan, EC rewrote the ground rules and decreed that while the government calls for elections, it is the poll body which will determine the dates for balloting. GVG himself was a party to the EC decision to refuse to go along with Prime Minister Narashimha Rao’s plan for elections in Kashmir.

Election commission is a three–member constitutional body. The Supreme Court has held (in a case in which GVG was pitted against Seshan) that all three election commissioners enjoy equal powers. So much so, if CEC Gopalaswamy wants to hold a November election, his wish will depend very much on the mood of election commissioners, Naveen Chawla and S.Y.Qureshi. But in many important decisions in the past, Qureshi is said to have sided with Gopalaswamy. So, if the CEC gets the support of Qureshi on the question of early LS polls, Chawla will be in minority and he can have his way.

Conventional wisdom tell that the Bharatiya Janata Party will be the gainer of early polls, provided of course, Mayawati and her third front allies fail to put their act together. Any how, BJP has reaped the benefits of ‘advancing elections’ in Karnataka and Himachal.

Gopalaswamy has about eight months left of his tenure. In other words, he would have demitted by the time elections become due in normal course for the Lok Sabha in May 2009, Navin Chawla would have moved into the driver’s seat by virtue of his seniority.

Delimitation has changed the character of 209 parliamentary constituencies. This has affected the traditional turf of many top leaders of the Congress, Rashtriya Janata Dal, Lok Janshakti Party, Dravid Munnetra Kazhgam, Samajwadi Party, and even Jharkhand Mukti Morcha. The constituencies of many UPA stalwarts have become reserved while some Dalit and tribal leaders of the Congress find their constituencies converted into general category. At least some 100 members of the 14th Lok Sabha have to search for new constituencies.

BJP leaders say that their party also has been adversely affected by delimitation. But their Prime Minister in waiting L K Advani is comfortably placed. After delimitation, Gandhinagar has become ‘more safe’ for him. It is said that the Muslim-dominated areas of his Parliamentary constituency have been shifted to other constituencies.

Gopalaswamy was part of the delimitation commission. He was appointed (when he was Election Commissioner) to the panel by Brij Bihari Tandon, the then CEC, in 2005. Upon his elevation to the post of CEC in June 2006, Gopalaswamy should have quit the delimitation body and appointed another senior poll official in his place, as convention demanded. This he did not do, according to some sources, who aver that during the illness of Justice Kuldip Singh he had even presided over the meetings of the commission.

Surprisingly, political parties, the Congress in particular, did not raise any objections. Senor Congress leaders accept that it was a mistake not to have objected to Gopalaswamy’s association with the delimitation commission. Politics is not collecting IOUs alone. It is an art of looking for talking points. By this yardstick, the Congress has lost some brownie points. Whatever be its failings, the BJP is a well-oiled machinery, always on the look out for issues, late Rajesh Pilot told me once.

Consider the way the BJP has been targeting Naveen Chawla after he was made an election commissioner. The party’s charge was (is) that Chawla is a family friend of the Congress president Sonia Gandhi. Another charge was that some trusts run by the Chawlas received monetary assistance from the MP local area development fund. The Congress could have picked on Gopalaswamy. He was the Home Secretary, when L K Advani presided over North Block. More over he was from Gujarat cadre of the IAS. Was it a ‘failure’ on the part of Congress? Or did the Congress not see anything amiss in the Gopalaswamy appointment?

When Chawla issue was kicked up by the BJP, B. B. Tandon was the chief election commissioner. He said he was not competent to take any action against Chawla. But Gopalaswamy had a different take. He had said on record that he would act on any complaint against Chawla after receiving it from Rashtrapati Bhavan.However, jurists like GVG Krishnamurthy are not amused. “All the three members of the election commission are equals. How can a CEC act against an EC’, they ask. Those appointed to constitutional posts can be removed only through impeachment route.

Admittedly, several questions come upfront in the event of date with November for LS polls. Is the election commission acting in consonance with the constitutional provisions? Are the superannuated bureaucrats at the helm of Nirvachan Sadan wrecking the democratic system after reducing elections to a half-baked reality show?

Yes, the CEC Gopalaswamy has got away with no knuckles in the case of Himachal Pradesh and Karnataka. If he repeats his activism in the case of Lok Sabha also, as some analysts believe he will, India will be face to face with a constitutional crisis that even the Seshan benchmarks have not made us visualize. Needless to say, there will be political parties to hail the EC move. As there will be parties to condemn the poll body. Which way the wind will blow?

We will know soon.

MUSHARRAF FIGHTS HIS LAST BATTLE

By M. Rama rao-Atul Cowshish

New Delhi (Syndicate Features): The battle that Pakistan Gen (retd) Pervez Musharraf has been waging for his survival may now have entered a decisive stage. After dithering for more than three months and even allowing their relations to savour, the PPP and the PML (N) have thrown the gauntlet at him; both have reached the conclusion that no further time should be lost in starting the impeachment proceedings against Musharraf.

Relations between the two major partners in the ruling alliance had deteriorated fast after the PML (N) decided to withdraw its members from the cabinet. The point of difference was the reluctance of the PPP to reinstate the senior judges sacked by Musharraf. The impeachment move is expected to kill two birds with one stone—it will pave the way for the return of the sacked judges while getting rid of Musharraf.

The fate of Musharraf will probably be watched with much interest in India. But it will be too early to see his ouster—or his continuance—as bringing any major shift in Pakistan’s India policy, which is characterised by Islamabad’s one hesitant forward step and two quick backward steps. Pakistan’s support to terrorist and fundamentalist forces operating in India will show no sign of ebbing away even as the country engages in confidence building measures with India.

After being lukewarm to the idea for weeks, the PPP has finally come round to the view that Musharraf has to go–the PPP prime minister of Pakistan has called him ‘irrelevant’. This change came after a ‘reality check’ Prime Minister Gilani made during his visit to Washington. Musharraf’s strongest supporters in the White House are ready to ditch him and have given hints that they are ready to do business with the anti-Musharraf civilian government.

While doubts remain about the coalition’s ability to manage a two-thirds majority in parliament that is necessary for the impeachment motion against the president to succeed it is reasonable to assume that the PPP co-chairman Asif Ali Zardari and the PML (N) head Nawaz Sharif would not have spent three days of marathon talks—the last session ending past midnight--without discussing how to find the necessary numbers in the national assembly.

Together the coalition partners do not command a two-thirds majority in parliament. At least 16 additional votes are needed in parliament to reach that ‘magic’ number. But they seem to hope that some independents and those of smaller parties, and perhaps even some from the main opposition party PML (Q), would find it hard to swim against the tide of public opinion and support Musharraf, easily the most unpopular leader in Pakistan at the moment.

Musharraf’s allies do not tire of asserting that the president being a trained commando would not give up his fight easily. This can mean that he or his supporters would also try to poach on parliament members to prevent the ruling combine from cobbling up the two-thirds majority. In normal course this would have been very easy for Musharraf. The notorious ‘agencies’ of Pakistan, including the infamous ISI, are always at the beck and call of dictators and the army establishment.

But the situation in Pakistan today is such that even the ‘agencies’ might not like to oblige Musharraf in the face of his overwhelming unpopularity. If reports from Pakistan are any indication, the pressure of popular opinion would be a big handicap in attempts to keep Musharraf in office once the impeachment process has started. Analysts see the country plunging back into deep crisis if the impeachment move fails.

For Musharraf to win his political battle with the help of horse-trading, complete backing of the army, currently headed by a man handpicked by him, Ashfaq Pervez Kyani, will be necessary. It will be a sort of another coup. Kyani might well be inclined to provide the support for his former army chief but only if he is prepared to risk a further slide in the popularity of the army. Never in the 60 years of Pakistan’s existence, as a troubled nation, has the army been as unpopular as in recent days. Army’s intervention on behalf of Musharraf is sure to push the country back into turmoil from which it had pulled out after a long struggle with the help of general elections in February this year.

Musharraf has another option to thwart his ouster—sack the government and dissolve parliament. But then what? Another long spell of his rule, whose acclaimed economic miracle has proved to be a hoax and pushed people to the precipice of deprivation? What is more the US, about to embark on a four-month course that will end with the presidential election in November, will have no appetite to do anything to rescue Musharraf.

Besides, Pakistan will have to go to the polls again sooner rather than later if the present parliament is dissolved. The outcome of another round of polls is not hard to guess, though it is a prospect that should actually worry the PPP more than Musharraf because Nawaz Sharif, an unhesitating critic of Musharraf, is said to be on a roll.

Pak President could pre-empt some of the troubles he is facing by offering to quit. Those close to him say he will not ‘surrender’. He could also send word to the leaders of the coalition that he should be allowed to stay on as he was willing to forgo some of his controversial presidential powers, especially the one that authorises him to dismiss elected legislative bodies and the governments.

Well it is a gamble only a commando will take. Musharraf is a desperate commando. It may not succeed since both the civil society and the majority of political class want to see Musharraf clipped but punished for all that he did or did not do during his nine year rule. The coalition has already prepared a ‘charge sheet’. Among other things, it says he had failed to take a vote of confidence from the newly elected parliament despite a commitment to that effect to the Supreme Court when he was elected by the outgoing parliament in October 2007. Another charge: he had tried to ‘undermine’ the nation’s transition to democracy and weakening of the federation.
Needless to say, anything that Musharraf does now to save himself would be taken as another attempt by him to weaken democracy in Pakistan. His hands look tied.

JIHAD INDIGENISED

By MALLADI RAMA RAO

New Delhi: From all accounts it is clear that Pakistan army’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency has succeeded in indigenising jihad in India. For over a decade Pakistan had no qualms or hesitation in sending trained and well-armed terrorists into India to carry out various destructive missions assigned to them by their handlers in the ISI directorate in the fervent hope that this was the surest way to grab Kashmir. But after 9/11/2001 when all of a sudden the world woke up to the reality of Pakistan being the hub of global terrorism it became increasingly difficult for the government in Islamabad to pretend that it has nothing to do with acts of terrorism in India.

The alternative was to double up efforts to help indigenise jihadi terrorism in India. It did not preclude Pakistan from providing whatever help that was necessary to build a strong jihadi outfit in India drawn from among the citizens of India—but without having to regularly but surreptitiously send large number of Pakistanis into India to execute the devious anti-India plans prepared at the ISI headquarters.

Initial attempts by the ISI to find enough jihadi enthusiasts in India began in Kashmir. It did not succeed at first because despite a pro-Pakistan mood among the majority of Kashmiris they believed in ‘Kashmiriyat’, which doesn’t preach hatred for followers of other religion. Also, the average Kashmiri is not drawn to the idea of taking to gun and indulging in mindless killing of fellow citizens.

To overcome this problem the ISI played on the feeling of ‘alienation’ among Kashmiri Muslims and create a gulf between the two major communities of Kashmir. The task proved easier when New Delhi did not take notice of this and even did some extremely foolish things that led to a genuine sense of anger against the government of India.

Pakistan succeeded in motivating the ‘freedom lovers’ of Kashmir to carry out an ‘ethnic cleansing’ in the valley as the rest of India and many Kashmiris watched almost silently. The ISI created a strong pro-Pakistan leadership in the valley that was happy to destroy ‘Kashmiriyat’. This pro-Pak lobby was to constantly play upon the people’s anti-Indian sentiments and also spread the message of jihad.

Though the ISI did start getting volunteers for the ‘holy’ cause in Kashmir the numbers were perhaps barely sufficient for waging a ‘holy war’ in Kashmir when the eventual goal of the ISI, set out by successive governments in Pakistan from the time of its inception in 1947, was to weaken entire India. This is when the ISI agents started a big drive for recruitment of volunteers to its cause in the Indian hinterland. The task did not prove difficult as there have always been sections within India vulnerable to Pakistani propaganda. The ISI explored and exploited these elements assiduously for over a decade. It established bases in Bangladesh and Nepal close to the Indian border to push in its own citizens whenever necessary after Islamabad was asked to stop sending jehadis into India—at least not overtly.

The provocative and often irresponsible rhetoric and indefensible actions of the extreme right in India made the ISI task of raising a jehadi army within India easier. The Pakistanis would not be really displeased to see these rightist elements within the country refuse to realise their utter folly and see the harm they are causing to the country by espousing divisive politics.

Consider some facts that came to light from the e-mails sent before or after the recent bomb blasts. It is from these e-mails that for the first time the country heard about an organisation that calls itself the ‘Indian Mujahideen’. The outfit may still be in a nebulous state or even a new name for the existing outfits but the fact of the matter is that a terror network with roots in India but covert backing of certain foreign forces has taken shape with active and sleeping cells across the country.

The ISI need not convey direct commands to this network as long as it serves its (ISI) basic interest in striking at the roots of secular India and helps drive a wedge between the major communities. In fact, the Indian jehadis need not even work as a direct franchise of Al Qaeda or Taliban if they are moving in the direction of the goal of establishing a new world order of their liking. It is significant that the spate of resent bomb attacks began in the states ruled by the Bharatiya Janata Party—Rajasthan (May), Karnataka and Gujarat (July 26 and 27). But it will be a mistake to infer that the Indian jehadists will target only one party or states ruled by only a particular party.

The e-mails from the Indian jihadis spoke of ‘revenge’ against the so-called atrocities and injustices meted out to the minority community. A particular mention was made about the conviction of those found guilty of serial bomb blasts in Mumbai (1993) and Coimbatore (1998) but no action taken against policemen who were responsible for aiding or abetting attacks and incidents of loot and arson affecting the minority community. These e-mails have expressed resentment against the arrest of senior office-bearers of Students Islamic Movement of India by the (BJP-ruled) Madhya Pradesh police. SIMI is banned but the ban has not made it a defunct organisation.

The government will surely have to redouble efforts to unearth the subversive elements but with a great deal of caution and care. A blind hunting of suspects, as demanded by the rightist forces, will prove to be counter-productive. Surveillance must be strengthened and field intelligence improved. Much of the problem of terrorism is attributed to lack of actionable intelligence and to what is called ‘intelligence failure’, a refrain that has been heard for a long time now.
Sometimes a ‘tough’ measure advocated by the government leads to clashes with human rights and other groups. Yes, it may be more correct to say that the opposition to such measures arises because of display of brute force of the state and the misuse and abuse of the law of the land.
Undoubtedly, the biggest problem we in India face is the lack of will on the part of the political executive to effectively enforce laws, whether they relate to terrorism or any other crime, and a deplorable tendency to ‘politicise’ incidents of terrorism. For Indian politicians any thing is a good political football- terrorism included. On top of this, the process of investigation and prosecution is pathetic. While cases relating particularly to acts of terrorism, are not easy to crack and a lot of time may be needed to resolve them, the prosecution proceeds at leisurely pace and it often ends with the accused walking free. Even after Police grandly proclaimed that they have solved the case!

ISI CAN’T BE TAMED

By Malladi Rama Rao

New Delhi: Pakistan’s flip-flop over its most infamous agency, Inter-Services Intelligence has a subtle message- ISI cannot be tamed. Anyone, whether a civilian ruler in Islamabad or his well-wisher in far away Washington, who entertains such a thought is living in a fool’s paradise, as are those who think that the ‘agency’ that makes many of the country’s citizens ‘disappear’ and rig elections on orders from the army can be humanised.

Pakistan People’s Party co-chairman, Asif Ali Zardari, is, obviously, not in synch with the unchanged reality of his country. That was why he had rushed into hailing the official notification that placed the ISI as also the country’s Intelligence Bureau under the interior ministry. He must have blushed a thousand times a day later when his optimism proved to be entirely misplaced as the ‘government’ in Islamabad clarified that the notification on ISI had been misinterpreted by the media.

Far from daring to misinterpret, the Pak media perhaps was genuinely puzzled by the late night notification after Prime Minister Gilani was airborne on his way to the US for his first date with President Bush. To suggest that in future ISI would report to the interior minister makes little sense given the clout of the ISI in the country. The agency, a creation of Ayub era, has always been under the direct control of the army, one of the trinity of ‘As’ -Allah, America and Army - that decide the destiny of Pakistan.

The army would have had no difficulty in making out a case against transferring the ISI to the civilians at this juncture when it seems to have made one notable achievement in the continued subterranean war of inflicting a thousands wounds on India - the spread of the jihadi poison outside Jammu and Kashmir with places far apart as Jaipur, Bangalore and Ahmedabad coming under a wave of terrorist attacks. These ‘missions’ were carried out by local sleeper cells, without perhaps no direct involvement of Pak nationals, as was the case earlier.

Likewise, the army would have also referred to accusations by the Afghans against the ISI activities in their country---a proof that the ISI has penetrated deeply into Afghanistan and is in a position to carry out Pakistan’s twin objectives of unsettling the Hamid Karzai government and hitting Indian-aided projects in that country as well as Indian citizens, including diplomats.

Now reality check on the whys and ifs of the ISI notification. What appears quite plausible is that the army was taken by surprise (after the notification was released to the press) and it lost no time in ‘warning’ the PPP-led government against interfering with its hold over the ISI. President Pervez Musharraf may not have spoken against the notification with anyone in the government, given his frosty relations with the civilian rulers. Also, Musharraf might have wanted to test the nerves of army chief Kiyani and see to what extent the General would be willing to go along with the American prescriptions and the compulsions of Zardari- Gilani combine.

Given the army’s stranglehold over Pakistan – it runs not only a parallel government but also parallel economy with a thriving private sector (with retired personnel) of its own, the GHQ could have scared the hell out of the Gilanis and Zardaris by telling them that if the ISI is civilianised, Pakistan’s very existence would be in imminent danger.

Some PPP seniors claim that ‘original’ ISI notification was cleared by top leadership - a euphemism for co-chairman Asif Ali Zardari who ‘remote controls’ the party from his mansion in Dubai. He had approved of the idea of taming ISI – an irrestible temptation of every Pak politician worth his salts - after it was mooted by de facto interior minister, Rehman Malik. Malik had good reasons to sweet talk Zardari into approving his idea.

First bringing the ISI under the civilian control would dilute the criticism against the ISI which has been accused of becoming a rogue organisation, a state within the state, as a result of which the army has also been getting a bad name. Second the US would be pleased as it has been voicing concern over ISI shenanigans. Third with ISI under his care, Rehman Malik becomes more powerful than Gen (retd) Musharraf.

Naturally, this scheme could not have been acceptable to any one in the army or the ISI, which is at present headed by Lt Gen, Nadeem Taj, who is related to Musharraf. A country that is still for all practical purposes ruled by the men in uniform cannot see a change of ownership in such an organisation.

From Pakistan’s point of view the ISI has been doing some very useful jobs that the army cannot perform, at least overtly, because of the country’s participation in the so-called war on terror. The ISI has been relentless in striking at India. On the country’s western borders, beyond the Durand Line, the ISI is continuing its mission of spreading the Taliban influence. In the days of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, this work was carried out at the behest of Americans who had bankrolled the mission. These days, when the Americans are desperately trying to demonstrate their hold over Kabul in a bid to boost Bush ratings, the ISI is trying to find its way into the power structure of Afghanistan and thus secure for the country a foreign policy depth.

The plain fact is ISI is an instrument of state policy. As long as Pakistan retains a policy of hostility towards its two neighbours, India and Afghanistan, the agency will remain Pakistan’s most powerful body, one that will brook no ‘interference’ from anyone and from any quarter. Put bluntly, whether the ISI reports to X, Y or Z matters little. Or, there can be nothing more than a cosmetic change undertaken to mislead the Americans.