By MALLADI RAMA RAO
New Delhi: From all accounts it is clear that Pakistan army’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency has succeeded in indigenising jihad in India. For over a decade Pakistan had no qualms or hesitation in sending trained and well-armed terrorists into India to carry out various destructive missions assigned to them by their handlers in the ISI directorate in the fervent hope that this was the surest way to grab Kashmir. But after 9/11/2001 when all of a sudden the world woke up to the reality of Pakistan being the hub of global terrorism it became increasingly difficult for the government in Islamabad to pretend that it has nothing to do with acts of terrorism in India.
The alternative was to double up efforts to help indigenise jihadi terrorism in India. It did not preclude Pakistan from providing whatever help that was necessary to build a strong jihadi outfit in India drawn from among the citizens of India—but without having to regularly but surreptitiously send large number of Pakistanis into India to execute the devious anti-India plans prepared at the ISI headquarters.
Initial attempts by the ISI to find enough jihadi enthusiasts in India began in Kashmir. It did not succeed at first because despite a pro-Pakistan mood among the majority of Kashmiris they believed in ‘Kashmiriyat’, which doesn’t preach hatred for followers of other religion. Also, the average Kashmiri is not drawn to the idea of taking to gun and indulging in mindless killing of fellow citizens.
To overcome this problem the ISI played on the feeling of ‘alienation’ among Kashmiri Muslims and create a gulf between the two major communities of Kashmir. The task proved easier when New Delhi did not take notice of this and even did some extremely foolish things that led to a genuine sense of anger against the government of India.
Pakistan succeeded in motivating the ‘freedom lovers’ of Kashmir to carry out an ‘ethnic cleansing’ in the valley as the rest of India and many Kashmiris watched almost silently. The ISI created a strong pro-Pakistan leadership in the valley that was happy to destroy ‘Kashmiriyat’. This pro-Pak lobby was to constantly play upon the people’s anti-Indian sentiments and also spread the message of jihad.
Though the ISI did start getting volunteers for the ‘holy’ cause in Kashmir the numbers were perhaps barely sufficient for waging a ‘holy war’ in Kashmir when the eventual goal of the ISI, set out by successive governments in Pakistan from the time of its inception in 1947, was to weaken entire India. This is when the ISI agents started a big drive for recruitment of volunteers to its cause in the Indian hinterland. The task did not prove difficult as there have always been sections within India vulnerable to Pakistani propaganda. The ISI explored and exploited these elements assiduously for over a decade. It established bases in Bangladesh and Nepal close to the Indian border to push in its own citizens whenever necessary after Islamabad was asked to stop sending jehadis into India—at least not overtly.
The provocative and often irresponsible rhetoric and indefensible actions of the extreme right in India made the ISI task of raising a jehadi army within India easier. The Pakistanis would not be really displeased to see these rightist elements within the country refuse to realise their utter folly and see the harm they are causing to the country by espousing divisive politics.
Consider some facts that came to light from the e-mails sent before or after the recent bomb blasts. It is from these e-mails that for the first time the country heard about an organisation that calls itself the ‘Indian Mujahideen’. The outfit may still be in a nebulous state or even a new name for the existing outfits but the fact of the matter is that a terror network with roots in India but covert backing of certain foreign forces has taken shape with active and sleeping cells across the country.
The ISI need not convey direct commands to this network as long as it serves its (ISI) basic interest in striking at the roots of secular India and helps drive a wedge between the major communities. In fact, the Indian jehadis need not even work as a direct franchise of Al Qaeda or Taliban if they are moving in the direction of the goal of establishing a new world order of their liking. It is significant that the spate of resent bomb attacks began in the states ruled by the Bharatiya Janata Party—Rajasthan (May), Karnataka and Gujarat (July 26 and 27). But it will be a mistake to infer that the Indian jehadists will target only one party or states ruled by only a particular party.
The e-mails from the Indian jihadis spoke of ‘revenge’ against the so-called atrocities and injustices meted out to the minority community. A particular mention was made about the conviction of those found guilty of serial bomb blasts in Mumbai (1993) and Coimbatore (1998) but no action taken against policemen who were responsible for aiding or abetting attacks and incidents of loot and arson affecting the minority community. These e-mails have expressed resentment against the arrest of senior office-bearers of Students Islamic Movement of India by the (BJP-ruled) Madhya Pradesh police. SIMI is banned but the ban has not made it a defunct organisation.
The government will surely have to redouble efforts to unearth the subversive elements but with a great deal of caution and care. A blind hunting of suspects, as demanded by the rightist forces, will prove to be counter-productive. Surveillance must be strengthened and field intelligence improved. Much of the problem of terrorism is attributed to lack of actionable intelligence and to what is called ‘intelligence failure’, a refrain that has been heard for a long time now.
Sometimes a ‘tough’ measure advocated by the government leads to clashes with human rights and other groups. Yes, it may be more correct to say that the opposition to such measures arises because of display of brute force of the state and the misuse and abuse of the law of the land.
Undoubtedly, the biggest problem we in India face is the lack of will on the part of the political executive to effectively enforce laws, whether they relate to terrorism or any other crime, and a deplorable tendency to ‘politicise’ incidents of terrorism. For Indian politicians any thing is a good political football- terrorism included. On top of this, the process of investigation and prosecution is pathetic. While cases relating particularly to acts of terrorism, are not easy to crack and a lot of time may be needed to resolve them, the prosecution proceeds at leisurely pace and it often ends with the accused walking free. Even after Police grandly proclaimed that they have solved the case!
New Delhi: From all accounts it is clear that Pakistan army’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency has succeeded in indigenising jihad in India. For over a decade Pakistan had no qualms or hesitation in sending trained and well-armed terrorists into India to carry out various destructive missions assigned to them by their handlers in the ISI directorate in the fervent hope that this was the surest way to grab Kashmir. But after 9/11/2001 when all of a sudden the world woke up to the reality of Pakistan being the hub of global terrorism it became increasingly difficult for the government in Islamabad to pretend that it has nothing to do with acts of terrorism in India.
The alternative was to double up efforts to help indigenise jihadi terrorism in India. It did not preclude Pakistan from providing whatever help that was necessary to build a strong jihadi outfit in India drawn from among the citizens of India—but without having to regularly but surreptitiously send large number of Pakistanis into India to execute the devious anti-India plans prepared at the ISI headquarters.
Initial attempts by the ISI to find enough jihadi enthusiasts in India began in Kashmir. It did not succeed at first because despite a pro-Pakistan mood among the majority of Kashmiris they believed in ‘Kashmiriyat’, which doesn’t preach hatred for followers of other religion. Also, the average Kashmiri is not drawn to the idea of taking to gun and indulging in mindless killing of fellow citizens.
To overcome this problem the ISI played on the feeling of ‘alienation’ among Kashmiri Muslims and create a gulf between the two major communities of Kashmir. The task proved easier when New Delhi did not take notice of this and even did some extremely foolish things that led to a genuine sense of anger against the government of India.
Pakistan succeeded in motivating the ‘freedom lovers’ of Kashmir to carry out an ‘ethnic cleansing’ in the valley as the rest of India and many Kashmiris watched almost silently. The ISI created a strong pro-Pakistan leadership in the valley that was happy to destroy ‘Kashmiriyat’. This pro-Pak lobby was to constantly play upon the people’s anti-Indian sentiments and also spread the message of jihad.
Though the ISI did start getting volunteers for the ‘holy’ cause in Kashmir the numbers were perhaps barely sufficient for waging a ‘holy war’ in Kashmir when the eventual goal of the ISI, set out by successive governments in Pakistan from the time of its inception in 1947, was to weaken entire India. This is when the ISI agents started a big drive for recruitment of volunteers to its cause in the Indian hinterland. The task did not prove difficult as there have always been sections within India vulnerable to Pakistani propaganda. The ISI explored and exploited these elements assiduously for over a decade. It established bases in Bangladesh and Nepal close to the Indian border to push in its own citizens whenever necessary after Islamabad was asked to stop sending jehadis into India—at least not overtly.
The provocative and often irresponsible rhetoric and indefensible actions of the extreme right in India made the ISI task of raising a jehadi army within India easier. The Pakistanis would not be really displeased to see these rightist elements within the country refuse to realise their utter folly and see the harm they are causing to the country by espousing divisive politics.
Consider some facts that came to light from the e-mails sent before or after the recent bomb blasts. It is from these e-mails that for the first time the country heard about an organisation that calls itself the ‘Indian Mujahideen’. The outfit may still be in a nebulous state or even a new name for the existing outfits but the fact of the matter is that a terror network with roots in India but covert backing of certain foreign forces has taken shape with active and sleeping cells across the country.
The ISI need not convey direct commands to this network as long as it serves its (ISI) basic interest in striking at the roots of secular India and helps drive a wedge between the major communities. In fact, the Indian jehadis need not even work as a direct franchise of Al Qaeda or Taliban if they are moving in the direction of the goal of establishing a new world order of their liking. It is significant that the spate of resent bomb attacks began in the states ruled by the Bharatiya Janata Party—Rajasthan (May), Karnataka and Gujarat (July 26 and 27). But it will be a mistake to infer that the Indian jehadists will target only one party or states ruled by only a particular party.
The e-mails from the Indian jihadis spoke of ‘revenge’ against the so-called atrocities and injustices meted out to the minority community. A particular mention was made about the conviction of those found guilty of serial bomb blasts in Mumbai (1993) and Coimbatore (1998) but no action taken against policemen who were responsible for aiding or abetting attacks and incidents of loot and arson affecting the minority community. These e-mails have expressed resentment against the arrest of senior office-bearers of Students Islamic Movement of India by the (BJP-ruled) Madhya Pradesh police. SIMI is banned but the ban has not made it a defunct organisation.
The government will surely have to redouble efforts to unearth the subversive elements but with a great deal of caution and care. A blind hunting of suspects, as demanded by the rightist forces, will prove to be counter-productive. Surveillance must be strengthened and field intelligence improved. Much of the problem of terrorism is attributed to lack of actionable intelligence and to what is called ‘intelligence failure’, a refrain that has been heard for a long time now.
Sometimes a ‘tough’ measure advocated by the government leads to clashes with human rights and other groups. Yes, it may be more correct to say that the opposition to such measures arises because of display of brute force of the state and the misuse and abuse of the law of the land.
Undoubtedly, the biggest problem we in India face is the lack of will on the part of the political executive to effectively enforce laws, whether they relate to terrorism or any other crime, and a deplorable tendency to ‘politicise’ incidents of terrorism. For Indian politicians any thing is a good political football- terrorism included. On top of this, the process of investigation and prosecution is pathetic. While cases relating particularly to acts of terrorism, are not easy to crack and a lot of time may be needed to resolve them, the prosecution proceeds at leisurely pace and it often ends with the accused walking free. Even after Police grandly proclaimed that they have solved the case!
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